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EASTERN EUROPE TRANSLATIONS

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
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24 April 1975

# FOREIGN PRESS DIGEST

## EASTERN EUROPE

*Translations From MILITAER WESEN* (40)  
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UNDERSTANDING OF ECONOMICS NECESSARY FOR OFFICERS

East Berlin MILITAERWESEN in German Nov 74 pp 15-21

[Article written by authors' collective of the Friedrich Engels  
Military Academy]

/Text/ Through the main task as resolved by the Eighth Party Congress, the economic and sociopolitical development of our society--as all other areas as well--is being continued on a higher level and with qualitatively more demanding objectives. In an interview given to the DKP newspaper UNSERE ZEIT, Comrade Erich Honecker said that we are about to realize the greatest sociopolitical program in GDR history.<sup>1</sup> There is a close connection between the main task as resolved by the Eighth Party Congress and the main military task as assigned to the National People's Army and the GDR border troops. This requires that the party and government problems of economic policy be constantly included in the political-ideological work with the members of the army. This makes a thorough understanding of the economic and sociopolitical orientation derived from the Eighth Party Congress particularly important.

The Main Task of the Eighth Party Congress Reflects the Objectively  
Determined Objective of Social Production in Socialism

The political power of the working class and its allies in the GDR rests on the social property in the means of production. From 1950 to 1970, the proportion of the socialist industrial and construction enterprises in the GNP rose by 12 percent. It was 89 percent in 1970. When the private and semi-state enterprises were converted into public property in 1972, all means for developing the material foundations of life came into the hands of the people. Almost 100 percent of all industrial enterprises

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are socialist property. In agriculture, 8.2 percent of arable land is public property and 86.3 percent, cooperative property.

Socialist conditions of production determine fundamentally the social position of the working class, of the cooperative farmers and all working people. At the same time they also determine the social function of our armed forces. The exploitation of man by man has been eliminated, and labor assumes an increasingly creative character. Economic and social facts are no longer subject to profiteering and to the mechanisms of competition. Every working person has an influence on the level of the standard of living by means of his own performance in producing social wealth.

In the last 25 years, the national income produced in our republic has increased sixfold, from M 22 billion to 127 billion. It includes the industrially produced income, which went up from M 12 billion to 81 billion. The scientific and realistic policy of the Eighth Party Congress led to a new upswing. While the annual rate of growth in the national income increased by approximately 4.4 percent annually from 1961 to 1970, the rate attained from 1971 to 1973 was 5.2 percent. The growth rate expected for 1974 is 5.4 percent.

As its strategic economic and sociopolitical main task, the Eighth Party Congress decided--in complete agreement with the tasks set by the CPSU and the other fraternal parties of the CEMA countries--on the "further elevation of the people's material and cultural standard of living, based on high speed in the development of socialist production, the raising of efficiency, of scientific-technical progress, and on the growth of labor productivity."<sup>2</sup> Thereby the party drew its conclusions from the basic economic law of socialism,<sup>3</sup> particularly with regard to its concrete effects under the conditions of the formation of the developed socialist society.

"As all economic laws, the basic law is effective under definite concrete historical conditions which influence the intensity of its effectiveness. Among this complex of conditions are such important factors as the state of development and the structure of the production conditions, the state of development of the material-technical base of industry and agriculture, the level of skill of manpower, the state and efficiency of economic management and planning, the state of the working people's consciousness, the degree of cooperation among the socialist countries, and the country's foreign policy and military-strategic situation."<sup>4</sup>

The complex of this and still other factors decisively affects the scope with which and the level on which the socialist society can make use of the basic economic law; it determines how close the connection can be made between production and requirements. Comrade Erich Honecker said about

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this at the Eighth Party Congress: "Even in the past, of course, our party let itself be guided by it (the basic economic law). But with the further development of the socialist society and its economic potentials, this inevitable connection between production and the needs of the people can and must be rendered ever more immediate. This is what we intend to live up to through the main task."<sup>5</sup> Proceeding from the main task the Eighty Party Congress conceived an entire sociopolitical program. With its purposeful realization, the population's standard of living has been raised systematically and is so being raised, including that of the members of the armed forces.<sup>6</sup>

The vitality and superiority of our social order, expressed in the results of the fulfillment of the sociopolitical program, become all the more manifest at a time when the economic upswing under socialism is contrasted by the stagnation, insecurity and inflation in the developed capitalist countries. The whole imperialist economic system is stuck in a deep crisis, tries to load all its burdens onto the working people and has none but gloomy prognoses to offer for the future. In clear contrast to that the policy of the Eighth Party Congress is directed at the stability, continuity and systematic planning of economic growth and of improving the people's well-being. The facts and experiences of recent years are making that evident and visible. They prove that for our socialist society, the economy is a means to an end, a means for satisfying the growing material and cultural needs of the working class and the other working people. And here we must always take into account that, first of all, the satisfaction of these needs is not restricted to an improvement in the material standard of living but certainly also includes the spiritual-cultural needs. Secondly, the improvement of the standard of living applies not only to the sphere of leisure time--housing, clothing, food, recreation, enjoyment of art and so forth--but equally must to the domain of labor itself.

Our party assigns an extraordinarily high rank to working conditions; it has declared their improvement to be an inseparable component of socialist rationalization.

The total complex of the material and cultural needs, the ever better satisfaction of which the main task is directed, as resolved by the Eighth Party Congress, centers actually around one of the most important concerns of the struggle by the working class: The formation of the universally developed socialist personality as the supreme goal of economic activities as well.

The point, simply, is to create conditions which will make possible and further the all round development of the abilities and creative activity of the working people. This amounts, as Marx wrote, to "the full development of the individual which in turn, being the greatest productivity, has its effects on the productivity of labor."<sup>7</sup>

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Especially under that aspect is the objective of the Eighth Party Congress inseparably and dialectically connected with the means for its realization: Growth and improvement of production, raising the people's prosperity, and developing socialist personalities form a unity and, under socialist conditions, condition each other.

#### Intensification--Main Road to Higher Efficiency in Social Production

The Central Committee report to the Eighth SED Congress states: "The socialist intensification of production is a precept of economic reason. And by calling it the main road we mean to indicate it is not merely something, but the main issue. It is not a matter for some but a matter for all."<sup>8</sup> In it lies the decisive guaranty that the stability and continuity of production and supply can be raised and the systematic proportional development of the economy increasingly better realized. Only through this main road--the decisive field of application to successful creative work by all working people--can the great increase in national income be ensured that is needed for strengthening the material-technical base of our economy and for further improving our working and living conditions.

The party, in focusing on intensification, is aiming at a fundamental and permanent task in terms of the present as well as the future. It is directly connected with the economic tasks for the formation of the developed socialist society and requires a new approach to the problem of economic efficiency.<sup>9</sup>

The substance of intensification lies in increasing the efficiency of social labor. Expanded production, according to Marx, is, "extensive when the field of production is expanded, and intensive when the means of production are made more efficient."<sup>10</sup> At present we in the GDR are in a process of transition from a predominantly extensively to a predominantly intensively expanded production. In the past it was mainly a matter of increasing the scope of production. Today and in the future it will mainly be a matter of producing more commodities with a higher use value and a lower expenditure per unit. That means primarily that we must raise the expended efficiency in reified, existing labor. It does not mean refraining from the construction of new enterprises. Yet that must become subordinated to the main line of increasing our efficiency. For the need for intensification, three factors should be stressed:

(1) "The economic, scientific-technical and intellectual-cultural potential has grown. It is understandable that the further successful development of the socialist economy will all the more depend on the qualitative improvement and efficient use of resources available of living and reified work, the greater will be the economic, scientific-technical and intellectual-cultural potential that we have available."<sup>11</sup> The scope of the

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production funding of our economy, which in 1950 amounted to a value of M 121 billion, will in the current five-year plan exceed the M 500 billion limit. This enormous potential must be better utilized by means of the latest scientific-technical knowledge so as to raise the efficiency of our whole economy.

(2) "The acceleration of scientific-technical progress and the development of the scientific-technical revolution are the decisive sources for raising efficiency and, thus, for the intensification of the social reproduction process."<sup>12</sup> For that reason it is a matter of letting the results of science and technology enter into the investment projects we already have and not only into the construction of new enterprises.

(3) The extensive way of expanding production constantly creates new jobs. To combine production increases constantly with demands for more manpower, however, is not feasible. Besides, employment is very high in the GDR, and one can hardly expect for the years to come much of an increase in the total of the employment-seeking population. Even so, intensification cannot primarily be explained from the limitations in the number of manpower. Above and beyond all else, one has to raise efficiency through intensification by carrying the scientific-technical progress into the economy in its whole breadth, as concrete conditions require it in any given case.

The task of increasing labor efficiency applies to all public spheres. Even where one does not produce, one must reach high results through minimum expenditure of efforts. That also applies to the NVA. The Eighth SED Congress task pertaining to the intensification and rationalization for the purpose of making social labor highly efficient thus also supplies the guideline to military activity. The point in ideological work is that one deepens the understanding for the party's economic policy and, at the same time, draws conclusions with respect to one's own activity.

Fulfillment of the Main Task Means Community With the Fraternal Socialist Countries

The 25 years of socialist construction in the GDR are indissolubly embedded in the development of the socialist community of states. It is connected with the formation of new socialist international relations among the peoples, a close rallying around the Soviet Union, the development of a coordinated foreign policy by the socialist states, the important growth of our economic and research potential, and the creation of an effective military coalition. Being part of the alliance of free and equal states working together on the basis of the principles of socialist internationalism, the GDR has always been able to support itself on the important political, ideological, economic and military potential of the community. "Each step we take today, each thought about our future," Erich Honecker

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explained, "is determined by our unshakable certainty that the pledge of our successes lies in the community with the Soviet Union. The decisive guaranty for the continual growth of the economy of the GDR lies in its working together with the Soviet Union and the other fraternal countries--which is shown particularly clearly today when the imperialist world is more and more strongly upset by inflation and crisis. The key to the decisive advances of our economy toward fulfilling our main task lies in our community with the fraternal socialist states, and mainly with the USSR."<sup>13</sup>

Economic cooperation with the socialist community of states is taking place today on the basis of the CEMA Comprehensive Program. The communist and workers parties and the governments of the member countries are consciously and systematically forming the new stage of their international economic and scientific-technical division of labor and collaboration--the socialist economic integration. As part of the process of socialist integration, the socialist economic integration forms the material base for the comprehensive cooperation and all round assimilation by the CEMA states in all domains of public life. This is an inevitable process caused by the increasing socialization and internationalization of the productive forces, the development of socialist production conditions and the class conflict between socialism and imperialism. Socialist economic integration significantly contributes to the further consolidation of the economic strength and the defense capability of the Warsaw Pact states. It constitutes, within the total process of social development, a key problem for the solution of all the other tasks and a decisive part of the revolutionary world process today, and it is one of the basic conditions for making full use of the advantages that are characteristic of socialism within the framework of the socialist community of states.

The fraternally aligned socialist countries are combining their scientific-technical and production capacities more and more strongly in order to reach maximum achievements with a maximum saving of time. The communist and workers parties, through the state organs in research and production, are systematically organizing the highest form of the international division of labor--specialization and cooperation--between production associations and enterprises. It creates better prerequisites for the material satisfaction of the needs of the working people and also for economically safeguarding the national defense within the framework of the socialist military coalition. Between the GDR and the USSR alone, 60 government accords have been concluded on research and production cooperation in decisive areas. The CEMA countries have coordinated their long-range economic plans, especially with the Soviet Union. The GDR and the USSR have agreed on joint planning between their ministries for machine building up to 1980. The biggest trade agreement of the world, amounting to M 100 billion, between the Soviet Union and our republic, is systematically being realized in the course of the current five-year plan.

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For decades the close fraternal cooperation between the GDR and the Soviet Union has guaranteed stable supplies of raw materials and fuels for our economy (for example, petroleum and iron ore, 90 percent; zinc, 70 percent; lumber, 40 percent; cotton, 80 percent). The "Friendship" oil pipeline and the "Northern Light" gas pipeline are playing a special role in this. One must also emphasize the fact that at an exchange value of M 50 billion, the Soviet Union is supplying approximately 50 percent of commodity shipments in machinery and equipment for the GDR economy from 1971 to 1975. All that is also important to economically safeguarding our national defense. There is going on at the same time, in connection with various economic processes on large building sites, as for example at Thierbach, Boxberg and the Nord Nuclear Power Plant in the GDR, an international exchange of experiences among the workers and specialists of all CEMA countries, a genuine process of internationalizing the best experiences and production methods. It shows that the consolidation of the international alliance of the working class in production is a process of historical importance, which does not merely amount to saving time and money. "This is a historical process in which socialism is proving its superiority in every country and, as a firm community of states, in the life of the people and the peoples."<sup>14</sup>

From these objective conditions of the development of the socialist community of states, the Ninth Delegates Conference drew conclusions with respect to ideological work. It focused on the need for further deepening the friendship with the Soviet Union and all other fraternal peoples, on improving economic knowledge, and on rejecting all attacks against the cooperation by our socialist family of peoples.

During the 25 years of GDR development, the SED and our government have always been mindful of the fact that the strength and developmental tempo of all socialist states can only be improved to the extent that every single socialist country places its own potentials, based on the principles of socialist internationalism, in the service of the socialist alliance. As a capable industrial state with a developed socialist agriculture, the GDR has incessantly, as best it could, contributed to the growth of those political, economic and military potentials and to the unity and cohesiveness of the socialist community of states. With 5 percent of the population, the GDR produces approximately 10 percent of the industrial production of the countries united under CEMA and, in 1973, had a 16.5 percent share in the foreign trade turnover of the CEMA market.<sup>15</sup>

At present the GDR meets approximately 25 percent of the USSR import needs in machinery, equipment and installations. For tracked vehicles this share even amounts to from 35 to 40 percent. These few examples clearly indicate that our republic is doing its share in the economic development of the socialist community of states.

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All countries united under CEMA have convincingly proven the vitality and superiority of the socialist social order. In 1950 they only produced 18 percent, but at present, approximately 33 percent of the world industrial production. In 1990, its share will probably be 50 percent. From 1948 to 1973, industrial production in the CEMA area rose more than twelve-fold and the national income, more than eightfold.<sup>16</sup>

From 1961 to 1973 alone, more than 35 million housing units were built in the CEMA countries. Approximately 130 million people could move into these new dwellings, which amounts to as much as the entire population in the FRG, France, Netherlands and Denmark. Especially since the Comprehensive Program was adopted it became possible to accelerate the speed of development in all CEMA countries and to make further progress in improving the working and living conditions of the working people.

In contrast, other developmental trends appeared in the capitalist states. The share of the EEC states in world industrial production, from 1950 to 1974, went down from 22 to 18 percent, and that of the United States, from 44 to 27 percent.<sup>17</sup> The working people's everyday life in the capitalist countries is beset more and more by increased crisis phenomena, inflation, rising prices, unemployment and social insecurity. The contrast confirms this: The states united in CEMA have in the last 25 years become the greatest and most dynamic industrial area in the world. Socialism is on a worldwide offensive; its advance cannot be stopped. This fundamental insight is of importance to the ideological work with army personnel. Here one must underscore that the worldwide and comprehensive safeguarding of the superiority of socialism, in terms of the international power ratio, calls for thorough efforts in the political, economic and military fields and that every member of the army, as every working person, in our republic has his own share, through his performance, in the world revolutionary process.

FOOTNOTES

1. Cf. E. Honecker: "Stability and Security are the Criteria of Real Socialism." In: NEUES DEUTSCHLAND (A edition), 30 May 74.
2. "Eighth SED Congress Documents," Berlin, 1971, p 49.
3. Cf. E. Honecker: "Das Volk der DDR kann mit Zuversicht die Schwelle zum Jahre 1973 ueberschreiten" (The GDR People May Cross the Threshold to 1973 With Confidence), Berlin, 1972, p 12 f.
4. G. Tittel: "The Basic Economic Law of Socialism and the Main Task." In: WIRTSCHAFTSWISSENSCHAFT (Berlin), No 12, 1973, p 1846.

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5. E. Honecker: "Bericht des Zentralkomitees an den VIII. Parteitag der Sozialistischen Einheitspartei Deutschlands" (Report of the Central Committee to the Eighth SED Congress), Berlin, 1971, p 39.
6. Cf. "The 19 May Communal Elections--Expression of the Socialist Exercise of Power." In: ARGUMENTATION DER POLITISCHEN HAUPTVERWALTUNG DER NATIONALEN VOLKSARMEE, No 6, 1974.
7. K. Marx: "Preface to the Critique of Political Economy," Berlin, 1953, p 599.
8. E. Honecker: "Bericht des Zentralkomitees...", op. cit., p 46.
9. Cf. H. Nick: "Intensivierung und wissenschaftlich-technischer Fortschritt" (Intensification and Scientific-Technical Progress), Berlin, 1974, p 11.
10. K. Marx: "Das Kapital," Vol 2, in Marx/Engels, "Werke" (Works), Vol 24, Berlin, 1969, p 172.
11. H. Nick, op. cit., p 22 f.
12. Ibid., p 23.
13. E. Honecker: "From Generation to Generation We Carry on the Noble Cause of Our Friendship." In: NEUES DEUTSCHLAND (A edition), 13 May 74.
14. E. Honecker: "With New Successes to the 25th Anniversary of the GDR." In: "12. Tagung des Zentralkomitees der SED. Bericht. Schlusswort" (Concluding Remarks to the 12th SED Central Committee Session), Berlin, 1974, p 100.
15. Cf. DDR AUSSENWIRTSCHAFT (Berlin), No 5, 1974, p 1.
16. Cf. E. Honecker: "With New Successes...", op. cit., p 99.
17. Cf. K.-H. Stiernerling: "The Socialist Economic Integration of the CEMA Member Countries--A Material Base for the All Round Collaboration, Assimilation and Union of Socialist States." In: WIRTSCHAFTSWISSENSCHAFT (Berlin), No 5, 1974, p 748.

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NATO STRATEGIC CONCEPTS SCORED AS AGGRESSIVE

East Berlin MILITAERWESEN in German Nov 74 pp 22-29

[By Lt Col R. Buhlmann, instructor at the Friedrich Engels  
Military Academy]

/Text/ In the foreign policy part of his significant speech in Alma Ata on 15 March 1974, the general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, Comrade Leonid Brezhnev, pointed to the stubborn resistance by the most reactionary and aggressive imperialist circles and to the active attempts by the enemies of peace at preventing a new political climate, and he emphasized: "The present period is complicated and contradictory. Reaction is trying everywhere, wherever it is possible, to start a counter-offensive, at least in some sectors, to obstruct detente and to complicate the solution of problems under discussion. Many bourgeois press organs, radio and television programs are widely being used for this purpose which deliberately distort the content of our policy, place its results in a false light and use the outdated cliches of anti-Sovietism."<sup>1</sup>

The imperialists, as one knows, have for a long time camouflaged their true foreign and military policy aims and objectives. They are posing as friends of peace and are trying to blame the socialist countries for the still existing danger of war. Out of the great number of imperialist theses, two especially have been made much of in recent years during their ideological attacks. They are the claim of an allegedly existing "balance of forces as a peace preserving factor" and that of the "double strategy," developed to justify the increasing combination between foreign and military policy activities by imperialism. It means that NATO presumably advocated "defense and detente." In close connection with that also is the legend of the "threat to the free world."

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This is amply borne out by the program points in the basic document by the SPD/FDP government on the current military policy of imperialism in the FRG, the "Weissbuch 1973/74" /White Paper 1973/74/.

What then is the class character of these conceptions? Which aims do they pursue and what functions do they fulfill? What is their internal connection and which place do they occupy within the overall strategic conception of imperialism?

The decisive cause that forces the imperialists to recognize the results of postwar developments and to accept relations with the socialist countries on the basis of peaceful coexistence lies in the increasing change of the international power ratio in favor of socialism. It is this which forces the imperialists to accommodate to the new situation and to abandon positions that have become untenable. Also contributing to decisively sobering up the aggressive adventurers are, to a high degree, the military strength of the Soviet Union, the combat readiness and fighting capability of its army and navy, and the joint military efforts by the states of the Warsaw Pact on behalf of constantly ensuring a superior fighting strength and combat readiness of their united armed forces.

The imperialist politicians and military and their ideologists are spreading the concepts referred to in order yet to obtain their old goals through tactics appropriate to the new international power ratio, while they are driven to disguise the cause and substance of what is going on.

As with all key theses of the anticommunist ideology and policy, two objectives are being pursued in this. On the one hand these forces are trying thereby to disguise or justify the imperialist class interests before their own population and the world public. On the other hand, their purpose is to slander the anti-imperialist forces, mainly the socialist community of states and its main force, the Soviet Union.

#### The "Balance Theory"

Let us first look at the "balance theory," for it came up first. It originated when it had become evident that the Soviet Union had reached at least the same status as the United States with its nuclear warheads as well as its missiles, quantitatively as qualitatively.

"Balance of terror," "balance of security," "nuclear balance" or "nuclear stalemate," "strategic balance," "military balance," "armaments balance,"-- this is what they were shouting, to mention only a few variants used in many speeches by imperialist politicians and military and in their publications. For example, the "Weissbuch 1970" makes the claim: "The unstable opposition between East and West in Europe of the early postwar period has turned into a peace, however precariously maintained, a peace

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at least in the sense of the absence of war. The reason for it is that the continent was incorporated in that balance of terror between the United States and the Soviet Union which beginning with the '50's has become more and more of a nuclear stalemate."<sup>2</sup>

A year later, this supplementary observation was offered: "The statements in the 'Weissbuch 1970' remain valid. As long as the Soviet Union and its allies retain their strong military potential in East and Central Europe, the FRG together with its partners in the Western alliance has to provide an adequate military balance. Maintaining a global balance of power remains necessary."<sup>3</sup>

The "Weissbuch 1973/74" also, in demagogic fashion, establishes an allegedly existing mutual dependency between peace and imperialist military power: "Peace rests on the balance in the military strength between West and East. This balance is the foundation for stable international order."<sup>4</sup> The Bonn government's Chancellor H. Schmidt, a former war minister, in a speech in September 1973, drew this conclusion: "The balance of forces, including a well balanced military power ratio, irrespective of existing and feasible political and legal agreements, remains an important and effective means for preserving the peace. The Western defense potential shows weaknesses which must be eliminated through appropriate means if the balance of power is to be maintained."<sup>5</sup>

Such statements make the assumptions and concerns of the "balance theory" very clear. The picture of equilibrium thus designed with the claim that it secures the peace is meant for the ideological manipulation of the people under capitalism. The imperialist forces are making use as they see fit of such a picture of equilibrium in order to push for armaments in the interest of the military-industrial complex. It is to give them also the possibility to present any sign of a revolutionary change in the world--be they successes reaped by socialism in its development, anti-imperialist liberation struggle or strikes--as a disturbance of the equilibrium and, hence, as jeopardy to peace.

Presentations of this kind deliberately deny the fact that it is not the existence of military forces as such, but the class character of the states and the policy determined by it, wherein lie the criteria for tension and war danger on the one hand and for security and peace, on the other. Both military coalitions are not aggressive and warlike, but only that of imperialism--due to the internal inevitabilities of that system. Disregarding the fundamental class content of NATO and of the Warsaw Pact and placing both on one and the same level means in the final analysis--and this is in fact the meaning of this mendacious equilibrium thesis--putting the blame for international tensions on the socialist military coalition and slandering the struggle by the socialist community of states that aims at peace and security.

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Responding to this kind of harassing fire against the extension of detente, Comrade Erich Honecker made this point: "It simply is in accordance with the laws of the class struggle in our times that the most aggressive circles of imperialism by no means want to adjust themselves to the changes going on in international relations. They want to get back to the cold war."<sup>6</sup>

#### The "Double Strategy"

It is similar with NATO's "double strategy," which goes back to early 1967 when "flexible reaction" was adopted as NATO's official military strategy. What purpose do the ruling circles of NATO have with this "double concept" to which they have attached, as demagogic embellishment, the label of "defense and detente" or "deterrence and detente" or "detente and security?"

Its essence lies in a purposive combination of military ways and means with other, non-military methods of class conflict. One of its sides, the detente as espoused by imperialism, that is to say, the comprehensive employment of diplomacy, economics and ideological diversion for the purpose of changing the socialist system from within, was formulated by the former Bonn ambassador to NATO, Grewe, with the following words: "Ultimately the policy of detente is an expression of the conversion to modified aims and methods: Renouncing all short-term efforts aiming at the 'liberation' of the East European peoples from the regime of communism, focusing on the long-range process of internal change in the East Bloc, in the course of which one hopes for, and possibly promotes, a gradual transformation of the political-social system of the Eastern states."<sup>7</sup>

The other side of this "twin strategy"--termed "deterrence," "security," or "defense"--provides the cover for NATO projects such as strategic armament and rearmament, supplementary armaments programs for the European NATO group and other measures through which imperialism hopes, by using military means in the sense of pressure and blackmail, to regain the initiative in the internal class conflict.

The "double strategy" is a NATO reaction to the active peace policy by the socialist community of states as well as a conception for active, opposing operations. Penned by Schmidt, it reads as follows: "The struggle for the shifts in power, spheres of influence and carrying through political objectives moves onto other fields--to the economic, political, ideological areas" while there continues "just the same, in the East-West relation, the danger of military conflict, at least in the form of political pressure based on military power."<sup>8</sup>

The tasks intended for the FRG Army in this were expressed by its inspector general at the time, Admiral Zimmermann, in an article of the

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journal WEHRKUNDE with the telling title "The Role of the Armed Forces Within the Framework of the Double Concept 'Defense and Detente' by the North Atlantic Alliance," as follows: "Today's role of the armed forces, their function, responsibility and tasks, derive from this political strategy conceived over long range. Through the armed forces, escalating as well as tension reducing 'signals' can be given."<sup>9</sup>

The FRG war minister Leber seconded this assignment of tasks for negotiating with the countries of the socialist community of states from the "position of strength" when he claimed that the CSCE was "the proper body for internationally bringing to bear NATO's double concept of defense and detente."<sup>10</sup>

In the preface to the "Weissbuch 1973/74" the former chancellor of the FRG, Brandt, again underscored the two components of the "twin strategy," writing: "Our being firmly tied within the alliance will remain the decisive precondition for a policy directed at balancing the tensions between East and West. With our Bundeswehr we too are making our military contribution to it."<sup>11</sup>

What one means by the concept "balancing of tensions"--in terms of the quotation from Grewe above--is also being expressed in the attitude and policy toward the GDR, where they keep babbling about "special relations," of the possibility of "convivial border adjustments" and of "keeping open all possibilities for the solution of the German questions."

Function and Position of Both "Theses"

In order to illuminate the internal connection between both imperialist theses and their reciprocal interlocking, one must look at their position and function within the overall strategic conception of imperialism.

The power ratio in the world, by changing in favor of socialism, places serious obstacles on the road of the attempts by the imperialists to reach their own objectives in the world by applying the force of arms. At the same time this power ratio furthers the desire to shift the major battlegrounds of the class conflict onto other areas--the economic, the political, and the ideological. Yet there still are NATO politicians and military who have not given up their hope to be able to re-elevate the opportunities of using military strength, through future military-technical achievements and to turn back the power ratio for the benefit of imperialism. Bourgeois ideologists and politicians are therefore posing in opposition to the policy of the Soviet Union and the other socialist states, which is based on the Leninist principle of peaceful coexistence, numerous conceptions of a "peaceful coexistence" as they imagine it. By these conceptions they are trying either to disguise the aggressive nature of imperialism or to find some sort of alternatives

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to thermonuclear war as well as to the Leninist principle of peaceful coexistence. The one of the cold war had the farthest spread. When it failed, another conception came to the fore which has since been advertised by the imperialist ideologists and politicians as being "peaceful coexistence," the version of the "balance of powers." It implies the incessant strengthening in military power of the states in the two opposing social systems which, in the imperialist view, could constitute the main guaranty for the preservation of peace. Another imperialist interpretation of "peaceful coexistence" is that of the "balance of terror." Its main theses lie in the assumption that once a first-strike advantage no longer exists, the "balance of terror" would turn into permanent stabilization which would guarantee peaceful coexistence. This variant has the proviso that the armed forces be constantly brought to the strongest military power status in order to reach the so-called stability through the balance of forces. Here, the internal connection between both conceptions of the imperialist foreign and military policy--the "double strategy of NATO" and the "balance theory"--becomes wholly obvious. Guided by the endeavor to use imperialist military power as pressure and blackmail instrument against the socialist community of states, one keeps continuing on the fatal road of rearmament, "in order to preserve the peace-security balance of power," as FRG war minister Leber recently tried to justify it in a publication on the military-political conception of the FRG government.<sup>12</sup> The "Weissbuch 1973/74" also is calling for close reliance on U.S. imperialism and for a stronger military presence by the United States in Western Europe, putting pressure on the West European states for uniting in a "defense community" which even is to provide the FRG with the authority to use nuclear weapons--all this in order to "preserve the balance."<sup>13</sup> The authors of this botched piece of government work have in mind "continuing the so-called 'strategy of balance' with the purpose of enforcing, from a 'position of strength,' the imperialist ideas of 'security and detente.'<sup>14</sup>

The babbling about the "balance of power" or the "balance of terror" hides a whole series of important factors arising from the danger of the arms race and the build-up of aggressive military pacts, such as the possibility that the imperialists might unleash a war through political miscalculation, provocations, technical error, accident or other causes. Such conceptions express an adventurous policy balancing "on the edge of war" and have absolutely nothing in common with the peaceful coexistence among states with differing social orders.

By that, the ruling imperialist circles intend "to condemn the socialist states and their armed forces as enemies to all detente and disarmament and make the imperialist war pacts look pretty as if they were the instruments for detente."<sup>15</sup>

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### Our Armies' Combat Readiness Secures the Peace

In discussions of the questions of the international power ratio and in contesting the imperialist theses the point is sometimes made that Marxist authors in their publications are also talking about equilibrium, though. What is this all about then?

The concept "balance of powers," when used in Marxist presentations, does not, in a fundamental difference to the imperialist ideology, serve to disguise, but to uncover the real power ratio. In this it is never being used--as the ideologists and politicians of the bourgeoisie are using it--as a synonym of the international power ratio in toto nor defined as a peace preserving factor, but it is always applied in a definite and closely delineated context and related to a concrete point in time.

For instance, the work by the Soviet authors' collective, "Military Strength and International Relations," confines the balance concept to the strategic nuclear weapons of the USSR and the United States. "The establishment of a dynamic balance of strategic forces between the USSR and the United States significantly restrains the military activity of imperialism in the world arena, forcing it to take into account the peace policy of the socialist community of states. Such a balance is characterized by an approximate equality in the level of development by both sides of their power in nuclear missiles. This is not a static level, however. It is in incessant motion and is subject to periodic fluctuations and changes in favor of one side or the other."<sup>16</sup>

In his work "The Leninist Ideas and the International Relations Today," D. G. Tomashevski points out that a "global dynamic balance of military strength between the United States and the USSR" was reached in the early '60's, when the Soviet Union significantly strengthened, quantitatively and qualitatively, its defense capability, which expressed itself above all in the number and coefficients of ICBM's, submarine missiles, strategic bombers, space weapons, missile defense systems and so forth. "As especially the results of the Soviet-U.S. negotiations in May 1972 have shown, even official U.S. circles today proceed from the recognition of the strategic balance."<sup>17</sup> According to the joint Soviet-U.S. communique, published in Moscow's NOVY MIR, No 28 of this year, the subsequent meeting in 1973 also endorsed "the continuation of the active transformation of Soviet-U.S. relations on the basis of peaceful co-existence and equal security, in strict accord with the spirit and letter of the agreement reached between the two countries and the obligations assumed by both in that agreement."

The publications by the Soviet authors referred to, in connection with the questions of the equilibrium, present the consequences arising from it as well as their certitude in the further advances by the forces

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rallied around the peace program. On the one hand, the balance as established in the sense mentioned above, they think, would induce imperialism to break away from it, but on the other hand it would force imperialism to accommodate to it and take the road of negotiations with the socialist countries, even that of limiting and reducing armed forces and armaments. "May the old world be content in relying on a relative balance of military power between the United States and the USSR. The real power ratio in the world, in its Leninist conception of the 'relation among the real forces of all classes in all states,' has irrevocably changed in favor of socialism and continues to change further in that direction."<sup>18</sup>

The countries of the socialist community of states, with the Soviet Union being their main force, advocate the continuation, deepening and extension to other continents of the process of detente as begun in Europe. They are fighting for supplementing the political by the military detente and for concrete measures on arms limitation and disarmament. In harmony with the successes on the political, diplomatic and economic fronts it was the military strength of the Soviet Union and the other states of the socialist community that made possible the turn from "cold war" to detente in Europe. That indicates the importance of ensuring our armies' constant high combat readiness. It, after all, decides how the military power of socialism can, even under current conditions, live up to its role in securing and controlling the peace.

The first secretary of the SED Central Committee, Comrade Erich Honecker, pointed to this dialectic in his interview at the start of the party elections: "The constant safeguarding of the defense capability of our socialist community of states, rallied firmly around the Soviet Union, and the ensuring of its superiority over any kind of aggressor is the fundamental prerequisite for securing the socialist achievements of our peoples and, at the same time, for consistently continuing the policy of international detente that comes from socialism. One must fully understand this dialectic in the class struggle today and act accordingly."<sup>19</sup>

Great are the goals the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries have assigned to themselves with their peace program. Yet they are real because the peace policy can rely today on the enormous strength of the socialist countries and take account and make use of the serious objective changes in the international power ratio, which force the capitalist powers to accommodate to the new realities. To contribute to these serious objective changes and their use in the interest of peace and socialism, as uniformed combatants of the class struggle, mainly means, as the ninth delegates conference has again underscored, "to keep the enemy clearly in focus, with watchful eyes and a cool mind, and to be ready to destroy any aggressor with uncompromising determination."<sup>20</sup>

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Readiness and capability for that are the best contribution to securing the peace and the further changes in the power ratio in favor of socialism. It implies that one must constantly unmask and smash all theses developed by imperialism which--such as the "double concept" and the "balance theory"--serve ideological diversion.

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# CONCEPTS OF AUTOMATED COMMAND SYSTEMS DESCRIBED

East Berlin MILITAERWESEN in German Nov 74 pp 38-43

[By Commander H. Ostrzinski, military scientist]

/Text/ An automated command system (AFS) is a command system in which electronic data-processing equipment (EDVA) is being applied for the solution of information and computation tasks.

AFS systems are basically different from systems in which the complete cycle of activities--beginning with the collection of information required for process control and ending with decision-making and task-setting--is automated and proceeds, in principle, without human interference. Functioning originally as creator of such automatic systems, man steps aside to a certain degree when they become operational, watches over their orderly functioning, and collects experience in order to be able to create new systems with still greater completeness.

Although man is being eliminated in automatic systems from the immediate command process, he nevertheless does not play the subordinated role of a "button pusher" with respect to these systems. Automatic systems are preponderantly being used for control and guidance of the use of technical equipment (fire control systems, for example). They are necessary whenever the reaction response of man is insufficient for reliable control of high-speed processes. The creation of such processes presupposes, however, that the process to be controlled can be described exactly and that the required process flow can be entered into the system as an algorism.

In contrast to automatic systems, AFS are a sensible combination of man and technology. These systems compensate, on the one hand, for the limited

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psychic and physical capabilities of man by technical equipment and, on the other hand, for the deficient intellectual capabilities of technical means by man. Man plays the dominant role in this primarily because of the following reasons:

1. Troop command is in essence and first of all a commanding of people. The essential element of command activity is to prepare the subordinates in a thorough fashion for the solution of assignments and to educate them to execute all orders and instructions consciously and with initiative.
2. While it is possible with the help of EDVA to prepare the variants of the commander's decisions, the commander is and remains, in the final analysis, responsible for making and implementing the decision even in command systems, which have reached a high degree of automation. The commander bears full responsibility for his decision. He is held accountable for having made precisely a given decision and for having acted in one manner and not in another.
3. The command process is not only extremely complicated and manifold. It mostly takes place in situations which are characterized by differing degrees of uncertainty about the actual situation, the intentions, forces, and means of the enemy, as well as about factors, which influence the progress of combat actions. At present, many of those factors cannot be quantified as yet or can be quantified only with difficulty. Frequently concepts have to be used, which cannot be clearly defined. Also, basically new tasks can make an appearance in the course of the command process, which could not be anticipated and therefore could not be calculated in the form of algorithms.

All this permits the conclusion that it will not be possible in the near future to describe the total command process in all its complexness and variety with sufficient exactness in the form of an algorithm, which could be automatically processed with an EDVA system. Man continues to surpass the most perfected EDVA known so far with his capacity to make sensible and suitable decisions also in uncertain situations, which are typical of the command process.

#### The Main Components of an Automated Command System

The AFS is headed by the commander as the sole command officer.

The staff organs make up the second component; these are understood to be all the organs of the respective command level, which are subordinated to the commander and which assist him with respect to certain problems as expert advisers in making and implementing decisions. The term "staff organ" is therefore not limited to the operational staff properly speaking.

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The technical hardware and program base make up the third component. Since the AFS differs with respect to conventional command systems mainly because of its technical and program base, the following remarks will deal especially with this component.

It should be pointed out, to begin with, that the conventional command system, too, has a technical base. This applies primarily to technical communication equipment of all types and, in a limited degree, also to certain computation aids starting with the slide rule and ending with the conventional punch-card station as well as other computation aids, which facilitate staff work. With the addition of the EDVA--which is considered an essential element--the technical base attains a new quality, which in turn leads to a new quality of the command system--the automated command system.

All the technical means used so far in command systems replace or facilitate certain defined individual functions within the command process. Technical communication equipment for example, replaces extensively the activity of messengers and couriers; typewriters and duplicating machines facilitate the preparation and duplication of documents. All these technical devices have, however, no part in the mental and creative activity of man in the command process. They were and are technical means, with which man expands his physical capabilities. It is therefore justified to describe even such technically perfect aids as tabulation machines, printing and duplicating machines, tape recorders and so forth as means for mechanization of the command process.

In contrast thereto, the use of modern EDVA offers the possibility to expand the intellectual capabilities of man in the command process. Thanks to their high operational speed and large storage capacity, as well as the processing of textual information and the production of ready-to-use staff documents, modern EDVA is able to solve in a short time complicated information and computation tasks as they appear in the command process. They are able to receive, arrange, and analyze considerably more information and in a much shorter time and to provide results in the form of staff documents readable by man than even a group of people could accomplish by intensive and uninterrupted work. Therein consists the essence of the automation of the command process. As was already explained above, man is thereby not displaced from his dominant position in the command process, but rather his mental and creative capabilities are supplemented.

The technical and program base of the AFS consists of two main components: the communications system and the automated information processing system (AIS).

A close interrelationship, originating from their joint responsibility for the smooth operation of the information processes within the command

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system, exists between the two systems. This becomes particularly apparent at the interface points of the two systems, which arise during data transmission by technical communication equipment. Problems appearing in this respect will not be discussed in detail in this contribution.

The Automated Information Processing system

This system consists of the following elements (figure 1):




Figure 1.

Key:

- |  |                             |
|--|-----------------------------|
| 1. Command Organ                                     | 4. System Bases of the AIS  |
| 2. Automated Work Places of the Officers (positions) | 5. Date Transmission System |
| 3. Automated Work Places of the Officers             | 6. EDVA (one or several)    |

--automated work places of the officers of the command organ (AAP)

--system bases of the AIS

--the machine complex of one or several EDVA

--the data transmission system (DUeS).

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The status and structure of every of these elements depend not only on the command level of the command organ, but also on the degree of automation of the command process and the available technical assets.

The automated work places of the officers consist, in principle, of the conventional equipment of such places expanded by consoles, picture screening apparatus, and printing installations with which information is entered into the EDVA and results of calculations, information, data and so forth can be made available directly to the work places.

As is the case also with other system elements, the quantity of such means available to the respective work place depends on the function of the respective officer within the command organ, the degree of automation of his tasks, and the availability of technical means and possibilities.

The AIS machinery complex consists of one or several EDVA with the respective equipment of the first periphery (input and output apparatus, external storage and so forth). It is suitable for solving primarily the following two groups of tasks:

1. information tasks (collection, storage, processing, classification, and output of information of a varied nature),
2. computation tasks for the solution of operational and tactical tasks.

The data transmission system serves to make information available, which by way of technical communications channels reach the command organ and which are then immediately entered in a form comprehensible to the EDVA, as well as to transmit information from the EDVA to higher or lower command organs via technical communication channels. Rapid and reliable mass transmission of data must be assured for this purpose.

The data transmission system is the interface between the communications system and the AIS. It can be arranged differently in different systems, but must be concretely defined in every case in the interest of smooth cooperation.

#### The System Bases

They play a central role in the AIS and consist of:

- the EDVA operations system and
- the user programs with the appropriate information array.

These two groups of programs form not only the precondition for the effective use of the EDVA machine complex but also for the functioning of the AIS and its concerted action with the command system as a whole.

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The operations system of the EDVA consists of control and processing programs. The control programs, which make it possible to automate the EDVA machine complex extensively, assume specifically the following functions:

- the simultaneous (parallel) processing of several user programs with due regard to priorities;
- the exchange of information between central unit and the peripheral equipment, which is located either in the computation center, or at the data transmission terminals, or at the automated work places of the officers;
- the protection against unauthorized use of the programs and information available in the machine complex;
- the automatic control of static-free and faultless operation of the EDVA machine complex including the execution of preventive and diagnostic tests;
- the demonstration of the work of the EDVA, and other tasks connected with the application organization of the EDVA.

The processing programs of the operations system include the language translators and the service programs. They have primarily the purpose of extensively automating and thereby facilitating the programming work. The development of extensive operations systems is closely related to the creation of EDVA of the third computer generation. In the final analysis, it is precisely this equipment, which is distinguished by high computation speeds, extraordinary storage capacities, the processing of numerical and textual information, as well as by the capacity to process several programs according to a priority system, that makes it possible to develop an AIS. However, the potential of this equipment can be realized only if its work is extensively automated with the help of the programs of the operations system. Even highly qualified service personnel are no longer capable to control the complex high-speed work process within the machine complex exclusively by manual means.

As a rule, more time and financial means are at present required for the development of the operations system than for the development of the EDVA itself. This is reflected in the price of the EDVA procurement, which essentially depends on the size of the operations system make available.

The second large group of system bases consists of the user programs with the appropriate information array. Since concrete tasks of the command organ are being solved by these system bases, these programs can be created only in accord with the requirements and assignments of command organ areas, in the interest of which a respective task is to be processed automatically. The establishment of user programs can be accelerated and facilitated

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considerably if it is possible to use the standardized solution offered by the EDVA producer either completely or partially.

These standardized solutions are being offered as problem-oriented system bases, either as programming systems oriented toward areas of activity (SOPS) or as process-oriented program packages. But even when such application opportunities exist, there still remain considerable expenditures to be made for adaptation of the standardized solution to concrete user conditions.

There are mainly two reasons why that part of the system bases, which consists of user programs, is subject to the most frequent changes:

1. Since the command system is not a fixed system but a developing system, certain requirements for programs within the AIS change in the course of time.
2. Since the degree of automation can be changed only gradually in the creation of the AIS, the user programs do not come into being simultaneously. Their size, too, increases gradually, whereby new areas are constantly being added to automation. All this leads to important requirements as to content and form of user programs, which must be considered in order to create out of individual programs a well-adjusted program system with sufficient variability.

All programs must be prepared in accordance with an obligatory methodology and uniform rules and forms so that they can be condensed into program-complexes and program systems, regardless of the time sequence in which they were prepared.

The structure of the information array, i.e. the input and output data to be processed in the programs and their organization within the EDVA storage system, must not only conform to uniform principles, but must also make it possible that the acquired and stored information can be used repeatedly for many very different programs (not only those already existing but also those to be created in the future), provided that they require the same information.

The implementation of these requirements brings up a number of complicated problems, which cannot be dealt with in the contribution, for example as to the extent of concepts which must be present in the total system to be created in the course of time before the concrete processing of practical problems can be tackled.

In conclusion, the usefulness of an interpretation of the term "automated command system" should be noted.

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1. The concept of the AFS described above clarified the interrelationship of man and technology in the command process and underlines the predominant role of man in the mental and creative part of the command process.
2. It converts the long-term goal of the creation of the AFS into a task, which can be tackled already during the preparation for introduction of modern EDVA through gradual increase of the degree of automation.
3. For the time being, the AFS does not require a new structure of the command organs. However, it cannot be excluded that an increasing degree of automation, i.e. the appearance of new working conditions in the command organ, will bring about objective conditions also for certain structural changes. Such a view gains in importance because the structure cannot be an object of constant experimentation, especially in military life.

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LENIN SEEN AS EXAMPLE FOR NVA OFFICERS

East Berlin MILITAERWESEN in German Nov 74 pp 52-57

[By Commander W. Ullrich of the Friedrich Engels Military Academy]

/Excerpt/ Frequently command principles and the concept of work style are not correctly understood and are even applied in the wrong way. It seems therefore suitable to determine, to start with, what is to be understood by command principles and work style.

Command principles are understood to be partisanship, a scholarly attitude, foresight, and command centralization. These principles are the result of the scientific generalization of the objective laws of armed conflict and are applied in accordance with concrete situations. As principles they influence the actions of commanders and determine the What and How. Every commander should therefore be guided by them in his practical activities and in the command of subordinated units.

There exists a close relationship between command principles and the work style of the commander. While command principles represent important norms for the practical activities of the commander, the characteristics of commanders, which they should possess in order to do justice to requirements.

The work style is the characteristic mode of operation of the commander, a certain order in his personal activity, the totality of his individual procedures and peculiarities during implementation of his command function.

The work style is formed, first of all, by the experience gained in the course of service and, second, as a result of copying and imitation (in



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the positive sense) of superiors, and, third, by taking notice and respecting suggestions made by experienced comrades and commanders.

In some cases it takes only a short time before the respective commander acquires a good work style, but occasionally it takes years. It is one of the tasks of command science to shorten the period required for development of a suitable work style as much as possible, since otherwise the effectiveness of command activities is being diminished.

#### To Learn from the Leninist Work Style

In order to characterize a given work style, it becomes necessary to single out the typical characteristics and peculiarities. Furthermore, it is of great practical importance to make recommendations which, if observed, help to improve the command qualities of the commander, promote the development of new qualities, and are thus apt to aid the acquisition of a suitable work style.

As is revealed over and over again by a study of Lenin's works, the main characteristic of Lenin's work style are great partisanship and a scholarly attitude. By partisanship we understand primarily the capacity to solve and decide every concrete problem in such a manner that there is conformity with the implementation of the main task. Perseverance and adherence to principles, based on the ideas of Marxism-Leninism, is the basis of partisanship.

Another characteristic of Lenin's work style is a scholarly attitude. Lenin stressed repeatedly in many of his works the necessity to orient all leadership activity along the lines of application of scientific methods and to develop it under consideration of scientifically generalized experience. The reluctance of some functionaries to use the results of science in their activities is described by Lenin as "presumptuous ignorance" and "stubborn despotism."

Lenin mastered the method of dialectic materialism to a high degree and knew how to harmonize theory with the solution of practical tasks. He advocated the search for the best possible solution and the application of scientific experiment in this search. Lenin wrote in his work "The Great Initiative": "...those who want to conquer capitalism must thus have the perseverance to test hundreds and thousands of new methods, procedures, and combat means in order to develop those most suitable."<sup>1</sup>

When shortcomings arise, some of our commanders are unfortunately still too intent upon finding a guilty party instead of discovering the causes and based on them establishing measures for avoiding a repetition of the mistake.

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Other qualities characterizing the Leninist work style are objectivity and the capability to assess a situation quickly. Objectivity as a general characteristic of work style can be considered a combination of different components. This includes not only concreteness of leadership, honesty, and responsibility for the tasks to be accomplished, but also intolerance vis-a-vis postponement of decisions and bureaucracy.

Lenin's objectivity reveals itself, among other things, in consultations and conferences. He energetically prevented long-winded contributions containing little useful information. He recommended with respect to consultations of the people's commissars, for example, that speakers avoid talking for more than 10 minutes. He also was against long written reports "...Write briefly, in telegram style...add special enclosures, if necessary. I probably would not read anything long."<sup>2</sup>

Lenin was very careful with the time of other people. He wrote in a letter to N. P. Gorbanov: "At present the experts are being simply invited to meetings and then wait for hours. This is senseless and barbaric. We must make sure that the experts are invited to come at a definite time."<sup>3</sup>

Another side of the Leninist work style is the demand that all collaborators of the command apparatus have the competence to fulfill their tasks in accordance with their functional duties. Lenin wrote in 1919 in an article "On the Uniform Economic Plan": "A communist, who has not proven that he knows how to condense the work of specialists and to lead with modesty by penetrating into the essence of matter and studying it in detail, is often a detriment."<sup>4</sup>

Lenin always endeavored to penetrate into the essence of any problem to be decided by him. He never hesitated to consult specialists whenever a problem required specialized knowledge.

In general, one can deduce the following from what has been said so far about work style: Every officer must start from the goals, which in the final analysis must be attained. There exist many attempts to establish recommendations and/or guidelines for the socialist leader. Doubtlessly they deserve every possible attention.

Our experience shows that it is appropriate to divide all aspects of the commander's work style into three groups according to their goal characteristics:

1. establishment and constant consolidation of the commander's authority;
2. creation of favorable conditions for the activity of subordinates;
3. acquisition of a rational personal work style.

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We shall discuss in the following the most important aspects of the commander's work style on hand of the groups mentioned.

#### Authority of the Commander

The authority of the commander is an important precondition for a successful command activity. It cannot be induced, but must be acquired by exemplary work and good relations with the people in the work process.

Commanders frequently test their behavior by asking themselves: "What effect will this have on my authority?" This self-assessment does not always lead, however, by itself to success, because in the final analysis every characteristic of the commander contributes to authority, even if in certain cases several of the characteristics are contradictory.

There is hardly any doubt that the competence in a specific command area and the capacity of the commander to use this competence are preconditions on which his authority depends, among other things. It can occur in some instances that the competence of the commander is insufficient for the solution of some specific tasks. He should not hesitate in this event to seek advice.

Knowledge and experience are also necessary conditions for authority and for the use of competence. The following rule should be followed in this: the more competent a commander is, the less he will be afraid to admit his incompetence in partial problems. With respect to work style the question as to the competence of the commander can be phrased as follows: What degree of mastery should one strive for in order to be really competent? An example for this: Take the case of an officer who received his education years ago. If he depends entirely on old knowledge and ceases to learn, this commander will lag behind and thus lose not only competence but also authority.

Another important characteristic of the consolidation of the commander's authority is his political maturity. The term political maturity is extremely multifaceted. The capability of finding one's way in any political situation, of understanding the line of our party in every large or small problem, of convincing subordinates as to the correctness of the policies of our party, and of basing oneself on the party and FDJ /Free German Youth/ organization--all this is only a part of the term's content. The political maturity in work style consists doubtlessly of the capacity to visualize even in the smallest task the great tasks, which have to be accomplished by our party and people. An obvious proof of the commander's political maturity is not only his good Marxist-Leninist knowledge, but also his capability of developing this science into a working tool of his command activity.

When one talks about the commander's authority, one cannot do without stressing such important characteristics as independence and the capacity of having a point of view. The fear of responsibility and independent

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decision is the worst enemy of authority. This applies also to attempts of camouflaging this fear with such excuses as "importance of the problem" or the necessity of "having to coordinate with a superior."

When taking over a new position, the commander has to find out what his responsibility is and what he has to decide. While it is a good human quality, in general, to have a point of view and to keep one's word, this becomes an indispensable precondition for the commander's work style. Nothing damages his authority more than not keeping a promise made.

Other conditions for a commander's work style, without which his authority would be unthinkable, are intolerance vis-a-vis deficiencies, high demands made on himself and on his subordinates, care for subordinates, and cordiality. The commander should be exemplarily in questions of discipline in order to hold his subordinates to discipline and fulfillment of assignments. When he himself is disciplined and applies his disciplinary rights correctly, this will have a wholesome effect on military order. An incorrect use of disciplinary rights has an unfavorable effect on the relationship between commander and subordinates and creates within the military collective an atmosphere of obsequiousness, and work defects are not brought to light without compromise. The commander is always within view of the subordinates. It is therefore extremely important for him to have the capacity to deal correctly with his subordinates, to listen to them, and to pay attention to their proposals and suggestions. He must have a thorough knowledge of his subordinates, both with respect to their strengths and weaknesses. All those things are important elements of the commanders work style, which have a favorable effect on his authority. It is necessary in this connection to mention also those elements, which are difficult to classify under the term "style," such as personal decisiveness, courage, firmness of character, and mental alertness.

#### Creation of Favorable Conditions for the Activity of Subordinates

A poor work style of the superior can disturb and/or impede the work of subordinates.

Deficiencies in the service plan are usually considered to be breaches of discipline. Some commanders frequently do not notice that they are violating work order by their work style. The commander, who frequently summons subordinates or visits them at their work place, keeps these subordinates unintentionally from doing their duties. This does not include planned consultations and measures of the superior for control and guidance of subordinates. Deficiencies of the work order of the subordinates have a negative influence and reduce work effectiveness. This applies also to problems in higher command levels, for example in the work climate between the chief of staff and the commanders of special troops of a

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division or between the department chief of a staff and higher officers subordinated to him.

The task of the command organ consists above all in preparing documents. These documents are prepared by one or several officers of the command organ. If the commander frequently interferes in order to improve a text or to make a formulation more precise, this can often be detrimental because it can lead to a situation in which the superior inhibits the subordinate. It is a characteristic of a good work style when the superior has confidence in the work of the collaborators of his command organ. In creating maximal opportunities for independent work, the commander himself has more time available for doing his real job and, in addition, provides favorable work conditions for his collaborators.

#### Acquisition of a Rational Personal Work Style

Time is a main problem of the commander's work. The struggle for a rational work style is therefore mainly a struggle to gain time. The manifold tasks of the commander require of him a good work organization. Exactness, organization, and planning should be indispensable rules of the commander's daily routine. Only under such conditions will he be able to command correctly, to make operational decisions, and to guarantee a normal conduct of the service. The struggle to gain time and to use time rationally should take the following directions:

- maximum abstention from tasks which can be handled by subordinates;
- shortening time losses caused by idleness between the individual activities.

Up to now there still existed here and there an opinion that the transfer of different activities to subordinates is a sign of incapability. But the problem is that the commander is responsible for everything done by his subordinates. If he gains time by transfer of functions and/or activities, he will be able to use this time in the interest of his unit. The commander should as much as possible abstain from carrying out functions of his subordinates. If this is done, however, because of a low level of training of his subordinates or of an extremely complex assignment, then this can be justified to some degree. Very often, however, the real reason is a desire of wanting to do everything better. This leads largely to a time loss. This loss must then be made up by additional efforts. This in turn can lead to a loss in quality in other transactions, for which the commander is personally responsible.

It is particularly important for the commander to delimit his personal area of tasks in an exact manner by determining:

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--the main tasks and ideas for their fulfillment, as well as general command activity and

--the partial tasks.

He must recognize the work situation within the command organ in time as well as the external factors, which have an influence on the activity of the command organ.

The commander also must coordinate the activities within his command organ. One should remember in this respect the advice given by comrade Lenin to comrade Shurupa: "You must free yourself from the hustle and bustle, which ruins all of us, make it possible for yourself to quietly develop thoughts about the work as a whole...and, above all, concentrate on the control of implementation and the struggle against bureaucracy and red tape."<sup>5</sup>

The gaining of time by transfer of tasks is, however, not the only way. Other reserves can be discovered, if one uses a correct analysis of one's own work.

Decision-making is an important problem of the commander's personal work, which for the time being is very difficult to solve by way of rationalization. This heuristic process could be perfected and accelerated by the decision-making theory. This theory is still in the incipient stage in our country. A real possibility for perfecting the decision-making capability is constant independent development of thinking capacity. Every individual must determine the concrete forms of this by himself. The most effective type and the most suitable exercises could consist of a general and deep penetration and solution of immediate tasks.

Without claiming to have answered all questions raised here, it should nevertheless be obvious that the work style of the commander is developed as a result of practical command activity. But practice by itself, however large and comprehensive it may be, does not automatically guarantee the acquisition of a good work style. This requires constant striving for self-improvement.

#### FOOTNOTES

1. V. I. Lenin: "Werke" ("Works"), Vol 29, Berlin, 1959, p 415.
2. V. I. Lenin: "Werke" ("Works"), Vol 35, Berlin, 1963, p 500.
3. Ibid., p 501.
4. V. I. Lenin: "Werke" ("Works"), Vol 32, Berlin, 1961, p 140.
5. V. I. Lenin: "Werke" ("Works"), Vol 35, Berlin, 1962, p 515.

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# OFFICER PHYSICAL TRAINING PROGRAMS EVALUATED

East Berlin MILITAERWESEN in German Nov 74 pp 58-64

[By Col Dr Klemann, Lt Col Juranek, Lt Col Kalisch, all of the Ernst Thaelmann Officers Academy]

/Text/ The socialist officer is a thoroughly educated personality with a firm Marxist-Leninist outlook, who can be assigned in a flexible manner. He masters the fields of socialist military affairs essential to him and is capable of using this knowledge and capacity for a successful command of a military combat collective. As a result of the training and education process at the "Ernst Thaelmann" Officers Academy of the Ground Forces, the graduates are to develop into socialist officer personalities, who as political and military commanders and instructors of the first and second officers' rank meet all requirements placed on them in regiments and battalions.

MKE (Military Physical Training) and sports at the officers academy make a major contribution in this respect because:

--they assist in developing the qualities of commanders in the future officers;

--they prepare the future officers comprehensively for the high physical and psychic demands of military service;

--they equip the future officers with a solid knowledge of the importance and function of MKE and sports in the NVA /National People's Army/, as well as of the effects of physical training on the organism and on character formation;

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--they make it possible for the future officers through purposeful application of all forms of MKE and leisure-time sports to create in the subordinates the physical and psychic prerequisites demanded by modern combat and

--they develop in the future officers a need for constant sports activities.

These goals for the instruction and education of future commanders presuppose a comprehensive and continuing methodological capability of the student officers in such parts of the instruction process as political science training, combat and specialized training, as well as physical training.

In the methodological training of the respective training branch, the goals, content, and methods must be pointed out and the steps, measures, and necessary means must be demonstrated, which the student officer needs for a successful instruction activity in the regiments and battalions.<sup>1</sup>

Related to methodological MKE training this means: The student officer must know the pedagogic rules and the organizational and methodological principles of physical education and be familiar with the principles of pedagogic leadership. This has the consequence that physical and methodological capabilities have to be considered within the framework of MKE at the officers academy. The student officer acquires in the course of training a capability to convey with high effectiveness the knowledge (findings) and skills acquired in this training branch in a pedagogically and methodologically correct form and in a class- and combat-related manner in the interest of his future educational and instructional tasks.

The physical training of student officers at the "Ernst Thaelmann" Officers Academy of the Ground Forces takes place in all years of instruction and planning periods of the training year. The time allotment for the individual instruction year amounts to 35 or 30 double lessons so that training can be planned for almost every week. Physical training is organized along the following lines: endurance training, strength training, assault course-, close combat-, and hand grenade throwing training, and military swimming. Morning sports, physical training during combat training, and leisure-time sports are also being used for the physical training of student officers. Analogously to the "Guide for Physical Training of the Ground Forces," physical training at the officers academy is based on an instruction plan. The lessons (double lessons) provide for requirements, which increase performance standards in a methodological and systematic manner over the course of the three years of instruction. The planned methodological instruction of student officers in physical education is also based on this instruction plan.



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The "Physical Training" branch has to participate in the solution of the following training and education tasks, in accordance with the goals of the program for training profiles:

- forming of the character qualities of the socialist officer personality;
- development of a high psychic and physical performance capacity;
- specialized substantive methodological training.

These tasks show that they contain characteristics which go beyond the specialty and at the same time specialty-determined characteristics. Going beyond its specialty, the "Physical Training" branch uses its means and methods to make a contribution to the development of the socialist officer personality and--certainly somewhat stronger than other training branches--to the general psychic and physical performance capacity. Training and education results of the other training branches are used for this and are improved by specific instruction and education potentials related to branch. However, the "Physical Training" branch has sole responsibility for the specialized methodological training of the student officers, and a specific training task develops in this manner; here, too, use is being made of the general methodological principles conveyed by other training branches.

The platoon leader himself conducts independently the physical training of the troop subordinated to him by using standardized uniform training documents. This task results in the following conclusions for the methodological training of student officers within the "Physical Training" branch of the officers academy:

1. Rational utilization of knowledge, capabilities, and skills which go beyond the branch specialty;
2. high-quality practice-related training;
3. purposeful qualification and education for independence through self-generated activities of the student officers;
4. methodology as a principle of instruction;
5. accent: the student officer is the object of education.

#### The Sequence of Methodological Training

The first phase of methodological training serves practically and theoretically the creation of foundations, because there is an input into the

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education process not only of topic-related conveyance of knowledge but also of a conscious demonstration of the instructional and educational methods chosen. Because of a relatively short training period, methodological training of the student officers starts with the first lesson. Because of the special character of the instruction plan, every training lesson provides for demonstrations by way of examples. This serves two objectives:

First, the psychic and physical performance capacity is perfected and military sports skills are developed.

Second, the future instructor experiences, at first only passively but consciously, the methodological development of physical training.

The second phase, which starts with the second year of instruction encompasses the methodological training properly speaking, in which the student officers actively participate. But it remains a principle up to the third year of instruction to constantly improve the psychic and physical performance capacity and to adequately develop the psychic qualities required by the program. It is the goal of the methodological training in the second and third years of instruction to gradually develop the methodological capacities of the student officers, as well as to systematically develop their methodological knowledge so that they will be able to conduct part of training segments and lessons independently and automatically.

The phases and steps of methodological training are summarized in table 1.

Table 1. Phases and Steps of Methodological Instruction  
in Physical Training

Phase	Steps	Instruction Year	Command Level
1st Phase	Creation of practical and theoretical bases, initial development of demonstration capabilities (learning of military sports activities, perfecting of motion characteristics, conveyance of substantive and methodological knowledge).	First year	instruction
2nd Phase	Depending on training content and individual preconditions, the officers are entrusted with the accomplishment of partial tasks.		
	1st step: the student officer himself carries out all norms of the "Physical Training" branch.		

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Table 1 (Continued)

Phase	Steps	Instruction Year	Command Level
	2nd step: the student officer, with the direct assistance of the specialized teacher, must as instructor solve simple training and education tasks (frequently as an immediate followup to the actions of the specialized teacher).	2nd year of instruction	Squad Leader
	3rd step: After being given an assignment and explanation, the student officer must solve difficult training and education tasks with little assistance by the specialized teacher.		
	4th step: the student officer, after receiving an assignment and explanation, must solve the training and education tasks at the officers academy independently.	3rd year of instruction	Platoon Leader
	5th step: during the third year of instruction the student leader solves the planned training and education tasks independently in practice operations with troops by using standardized training materials.		

This graduated approach is necessary so that the developing young officer can accustom himself systematically to the activities and, above all, in order to give him the sense of success by seeing to it that the tasks can be accomplished. The training activity has, however, an educational effect not only on the individual, but also on the entire collective. Since it is objectively impossible for every student officer to go through all partial steps of the methodological training and since this also is unnecessary, a methodological training by example is being used at times.

Also, it is possible for the instructor (specialized teacher) because of the methodological sequence to make individual differentiations for different student officers with regard to:

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- the degree of difficulty of the task;
- the command level;
- the degree of exerting influence and providing assistance;
- the extent of preparations; and,
- the extent of training to be carried out.

It is precisely because of individual peculiarities and the interest in differentiated performance requirements--practically and theoretically--that one must rule out considering the sequence of methodological training as a dogma. It is designed to promote a systematic, continuous, and clearly balanceable methodological instruction in the "Physical Training" branch and to preclude sporadic methodological capabilities.

#### Forms of Methodological Instruction

Self-activity of the student officer is the main form of methodological instruction in our branch. Other forms are the instructive-methodological instruction, which is carried out twice in the second and third years of instruction with regard to assault course training and strength training, and methodology instruction in the form of a teacher's lecture.

In preparation of the instruction year, the teacher's lecture explains illustratively the organizational and methodological make-up of an instruction lesson in the "Physical Training" branch. We consider instruction activity justified in the "Physical Training" branch in the third year of instruction on the command level of the platoon leader, since at that point in time sufficient practical examples for instruction structure have been demonstrated, sufficient substantive and methodological knowledge has been conveyed, and basic experience has been gained by the student officers.

In order to illustrate the principle of preparation of subordinated instructors, the student officer is given the assignment in the third year of instruction to carry out as a platoon leader (company chief) an instructive-methodological instruction with the officer students of his platoon.

Let us illustrate once more the sequence of methodological instruction in the second phase on hand of the instruction assignment "Learning to Surmount a Scaling Wall." The specialized teacher demonstrates at first to the student officers how the instruction is to be handled. After the instructor has presented the training and education tasks to be solved, a student officer presents the instruction problem. The specialized teacher assists to a minor degree by prompting of commands, indicating mistakes and so forth. The student officer acts independently (Table 2).

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Table 2. Sequence of the Instruction "Learning to Surmount a Scaling Wall"

Instruction Segment	Activities of the Instructor	Activities of the Student Officers
1.1	Identification, demonstration, explanation, and repetition of the exercise	Exercises for scaling the wall
1.2	Corrections	Continuation of exercise
1.3	Termination of instruction when the student officers master the rough form of scaling the wall and have become conscious of the methodological systematics	
2.	Repetition of the motivation and goals (sequence of instruction, arrangement-distribution- and operation forms used, commands, instruction and education methods, degree of external strain, additional methodological aids own position)	One of the student officers repeats. With assistance of the instructor, he is able to follow the correct sequence and to use the correct instruction and education methods, forms, and command and/or auxiliary means. He carried out his assignment on the concrete level of his methodological training. He must prove himself and create at the same time a repetition for the other student officers.

The sameness of instruction topics in each of the three years of instruction leaves enough room for this nuanced methodological instruction and offers the possibility to systematically increase the qualitative demands on the activities of the student officers. The instructor is able during the first year of instruction to have the student officers only repeat and explain the sequence of exercises. Together with an increase in the knowledge, skills, and self-activity and with better methodological capabilities of the student officers, the instructor will be able in the third year of instruction to do without demonstration of the instruction elements and to exert only a guidance and control function.

The only criterion for the quality of methodological instruction of the student officers is the capability with which the future officer will as

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an instructor carry out the physical training of his subordinates on hand of the training guideline. Being fully responsible for implementation of the training and education tasks, he must create such preconditions "that military physical education in all its forms is considered a political task."<sup>2</sup> Viewed from this aspect, MKE is to be implemented as a firmly integrated and necessary component of combat training and as a training principle.

The results obtained during inspection within the Winter unit in tests of the physical performance capacities of the graduates of the last few years in the assault course norm 10(II), weight lifting, chin-ups, and 3,000-meter track events demonstrated a well developed performance fitness and a stable development of motion characteristics and motion skills. Such important situations, involving decisions and proofs of performance for individuals and the collective, as they occur during inspections show the present performance status of the trainer and his subordinates without a doubt. As a future instructor must therefore already during his training "understand that the development of the physical performance of subordinates depends to a large degree on his ability to foster in them an inner readiness to exercise and train, to organize the training process in an exemplary manner, and to enforce the requirements contained in orders and regulations consistently."<sup>3</sup>

A few still prevailing defects stimulate us to exhaust the still existing reserves more fully. For example, morning sports, physical training in combat training, and leisure-time sports still offer many opportunities for preparing the student officers to develop an effective MKE and interesting leisure-time sports for the troops. A detailed methodological guideline for individual forms of MKE can be a valuable aid in this. Also, a regular and thorough evaluation of the troop practice of student officers and the experiences of unit officers can provide pointers for a better and more rational methodological qualification of future officers not only for MKE but also for leisure-time sports.

## FOOTNOTES

1. See authors' collective: "Methodik des Sportsunterrichts" (Methodology of Sports Instruction), Berlin, 1973, p 16.
2. DV /service order/ 010/0/002, 1973, p 7.
3. H. Jodl: "What a Young Officer Should Observe in Military Physical Training." In: MILITAERWESEN (Berlin), No 11, 1973, p 58.

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PROGRESS AT GENEVA TALKS CONSIDERED POSSIBLE, NECESSARY

East Berlin MII.ITAERWESEN in German Nov 74 pp 73-74

[Commentary by G.E]

/Text/ After a summer recess, the second phase of the Conference on Security and Cooperation was resumed at Geneva in the beginning of September. This took place at a time when the need for arriving at a successful conclusion of the conference as soon as possible was urgently emphasized by various international developments.

Thus, the insidious NATO attack on the Republic of Cyprus provided renewed proof not only of the aggressiveness and unpopular attitude of the imperialist military pact, but at the same time also of the urgent necessity that all European states unequivocally recognize such principles of international law as the inviolability of existing borders, renunciation of the use of force, the territorial integrity of states, and peaceful settlement of disputes.

The aggressive imperialist forces at the same time also intensified their activities carried out in central Europe for the purpose of retarding the process of detente. Typical examples of this in the FRG are the following: The installation of Bonn's Federal Environmental Agency in West Berlin, which clearly violates the four-power agreement on West Berlin and which was carried out with demonstrative and provocative intentions; the impudent meddling in the internal affairs of the GDR by means of the so-called Central Information Collection Office of the FRG in Salzgitter, which arrogates to itself the right to engage in "investigatory and preliminary proceedings" against employees of GDR government organs; and

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the intensified appearance of openly revanchist forces in the FRG and in West Berlin with their notorious "Reunion in Freedom" annexation motto, which dates back to the time of the cold war. In addition to this, there is the continuing NATO rearmament, especially within the framework of the "Europe Group," for which there are no doubt new decisions being made at the December session of NATO. In view of these circumstances it is therefore necessary to impart to the European detente process a new and strong impulse by means of a successful conclusion of the Conference on Security and Cooperation, and thereby effectively to continue the peace offensive initiated by the states of the socialist community. Relying on the growing influence of the socialist community of states, especially that of the USSR, relying on the growing strength of the forces of peace in the capitalist countries, and encouraged also by the realistically thinking forces among the leaderships of many of these countries, socialist diplomacy has during the second phase at Geneva already achieved noteworthy results which can form the basis for further efforts during the current round of negotiations. Up to the time of the summer recess, approximately 160 segments of the final documents had been prepared and agreed upon in about 1,300 sessions of the various working organs in the course of this second phase, which had begun in September 1973.

In this connection particular mention must be made of the progress achieved by the First Commission in formulating the political main document of the conference. Six of the planned ten principles which are to determine the future relations between the 35 participating states have essentially already been formulated. Included in them are such important political and international law principles as sovereign equality, abstention from the use of force or from the threat of the use of force, territorial integrity of states, and peaceful settlement of disputes. In this connection, of course, special importance is to be accorded to the likewise essentially agreed-upon principle of the inviolability of existing borders since--as has been clearly demonstrated by the history of the wars of this century--peace and security depend on universal respect for and observance of precisely this principle.

The Second Commission, which deals with the questions pertaining to economic, scientific, and technological cooperation, has also made good progress and is close to the completion of its work. The results show that the problems pertaining to promoting commerce, to closer cooperation in the industrial sphere, and to a joint approach to questions of environmental protection, which are in the interest of all participants, can be solved if all parties concerned have good intentions.

The greatest difficulties, and thus also the still-to-be-mastered hardest work continues to be that of the Third Commission, whose task it is to formulate the final draft of the document on cooperation in the spheres of culture, education, information, and contacts. To be sure--and this does constitute noteworthy progress--agreement has been reached on inclusion in the preamble to this final document a formulation according

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to which all cooperation must serve the reinforcement of peace, mutual understanding among peoples, and the spiritual enrichment of people, and must be carried out with full observance of the ten basic principles of the main document. Thus, for instance, any interference in the internal affairs of another state is forbidden. This should effectively check imperialist attempts to engage in ideological diversion under the cover of "free information exchange."

And, finally, one can also notice the development of a reasonable compromise with respect to the fourth item on the agenda, i.e. with respect to the further steps to be taken after the conference has ended. One can detect general agreement on seeking attainment of the necessary continuity in connection with the solution of further tasks pertaining to European security and cooperation.

The concluding phase of the Geneva Conference will once more call for strenuous efforts to prepare a final version of the documents on the basis of which decisions can be made so that in the not too distant future the third phase of the European security conference can take place at the highest level in Helsinki. Jointly with the USSR and the other socialist allies, the GDR will with all the strength at its disposal make its contribution to ensuring a successful outcome of this conference in spite of all opposition.

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PROBLEMS CITED IN PREPARATION OF TRAINING GROUP LEADERS

East Berlin MILITAERWESEN in German Nov 74 pp 98B-103B

[By Lt Col M. Jung, instructor]

/Text/ The social science departments at the military academies bear great responsibility for seeing to it that the future officers are enabled to live up to their political guidance work duties in the troop units. The social science training is oriented toward reinforcement of the basic convictions of the cadets and toward helping them to grasp the profound contents of the works of Marx, Engels, and Lenin as well as of the basic party decisions.

The young cadres should already at the military academy level learn how to recognize, expose, and resist the ideological diversion of the class enemy. The cadets are being acquainted with the most variegated means, forms, and methods of ideological work, and especially with those of oral propaganda and agitation. The objective is to impart to them such knowledge and such skills as to enable them continually and effectively to carry out political work with their subordinates in the troop units, and to educate them to think and act along class lines in the interest of continuous improvement of their combat readiness.

In recent years greater emphasis has already been placed in the training of cadets on qualifying them to become training group leaders in view of the importance to be accorded to precisely this function in the process of political shaping and education of army personnel.

Just how have we, in our department, managed to qualify cadets for their future work as training group leaders, and what kinds of problems have become noticeable in this connection?

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In the sphere of training group leader work as well as in connection with solving many other political and military tasks it is again and again becoming apparent that the young officers are fully aware of the importance of politico-ideological education of the soldiers and noncommissioned officers for the fulfillment of military tasks. They are fundamentally willing to educate their subordinates in a manner which will cause them successfully and with a high degree of initiative to strive for the attainment of a high level of combat readiness.

The majority of them are preparing themselves thoroughly to perform effective political work in combat training and in the service-connected areas, and for this they have the basic knowledge and skills. This is being confirmed by commanders, political workers in the troop units and formations, as well as by training officers at the "Franz Mehring" Military Academy. Thus, among other things, the following is stated in a report of the commander of a troop formation of the LSK/LV /air force and air defense command/: "The officers have come to recognize the significance of and the need for political work and are facing this task with an open mind....The majority of the young officers are living up to the requirements." In an assessment of the use of cadets as training group leaders for soldiers, made by the social science department of our military academy, it is also pointed out that the future officers are distinguishing themselves through their positive attitude towards political work, and that they are preparing themselves for the educational discussions with a high degree of awareness of their responsibility and with good qualifications.

These gratifying results are not in the last instance due to the socio-scientific training officers of the military academy, who are ever more successfully striving to raise the ideological-theoretical level of socio-scientific training, to take into account the political and military requirements of the troops, and in their teaching and research work to proceed from the latest findings of Soviet social science.

In contrast to this positive development there is, however, the fact that in their practical work the young officers also encounter difficulties and problems which they can only handle inadequately. Thus, young officers who are serving as training group leaders have mentioned in the course of discussions that successful application of the knowledge acquired at the military academy and of the skills which they had already acquired is not always an easy matter. The question of "What causes you the most difficulties in your work as a training group leader?" was answered by Lt H. as follows: "I am not as yet satisfied with my instructive discussions. The willingness of the soldiers to cooperate and their knowledge vary greatly. I am not always able to convince all of them. Trying to assess their achievements also frequently gives me a headache."

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Another comrade, Senior Lt W., demands that "the military academy place a higher value on methodical training of officers." He is of the opinion that, in connection with the work of qualifying training group leaders, "there still is too little methodical instruction given." It is thus apparent that the young training group leaders are making strenuous efforts to shape political education in a manner which is well-founded theoretically, effective educationally, and which takes into account the actual situations existing in the units concerned. They are, however, not always able to convert such intentions into action. Thus it happens that at times they speak over the heads of the soldiers and noncommissioned officers and that they include their experiences, attitudes, and feelings only to an inadequate extent in the process of awareness development. Methodical shortcomings and content-related flaws in the activities of the young training group leaders frequently make it difficult for them to bring about lively cooperation on the part of all participants. This becomes evident when problem discussions are conducted, when controversial discussions develop, and when issue is taken with erroneous concepts. Many of the young officers at times do not act aggressively enough and do not know how to argue their case convincingly.

It should be pointed out at this point that no individual in the troop units should expect to get accomplished training group leaders, as it were, from the officer's academy. "To make such a demand would be unrealistic and it would mean that we ignore the real-life and troop experiences necessary for the maturing process of a socialist officer."<sup>1</sup>

The authors of the book "Soldat und Krieg" [Soldier and War] also comment on this and make reference to Marshal of the Soviet Union A. M. Vassilevsky, who has written the following concerning this subject: "The training installations of the Soviet Army have gathered valuable experiences in the sphere of developing commander, political, and engineer cadres....One must, however, not proceed from the assumption that the training installations equip the officer adequately with...knowledge and skills so that it is subsequently merely a matter of making high demands on him and that everything will run smoothly."<sup>2</sup> It would be a mistake to wish to conclude from this that the possibilities for qualifying cadets have been fully exhausted. Army General H. Hoffmann therefore demands that the military academies "must do much more to prepare the graduates for the conditions existing in the troop units. It is necessary in this connection to bring about a type of training which is truly oriented toward real-life situations and which is troop-related."<sup>3</sup>

This decisive demand has also been made at the Ninth Delegates Conference of the SED party organizations in the NVA [National People's Army] and in the border troops of the GDR. It imposes upon all social-science training officers the duty to develop solid socialist basic convictions in the

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officer cadets and "in particular to impart to them theoretical knowledge and the know-how which enables them correctly, creatively, and with a high degree of perspicacity to apply the theory of Marxism-Leninism under whatever concrete military service conditions exist at any particular time."<sup>4</sup>

How can socio-scientific training be utilized ever more advantageously for qualifying cadets as training group leaders?

The shaping of a cadet into a training group leader is a developmental process which is subject to the influences of a number of conditions which will be discussed below.

#### Influence of External Conditions

The process of capability development in the sphere of socio-scientific training is essentially determined by the training officer-cadet-subject relation and by the conditions inherent therein. There are conditions which are directly within the zone of training officer guidance. What are they?

#### The Personality of the Training Officer

One thesis which is being confirmed in pedagogic practice over and over again is the following: That which is intended to penetrate the heads of the students must first pass through the head of the teacher. If the training officer wants to enable the cadets to become training group leaders, he must possess the appropriate personality traits. This first of all presupposes that the training officer be familiar with the skills necessary for political work with the troops which are objectively required of training group leaders, and that he possess knowledge concerning the nature of these skills and concerning their place in the overall personality structure as well as concerning the conditions and methods necessary for their development and perfection. It is the duty of the training officer steadfastly, persistently, consistently, and notwithstanding any possibly developing difficulties to work at developing in the cadets those skills which are called for in the training documents. The conviction of the training officer, his clearly held views concerning the requirements contained in the documents, and his optimism in overcoming difficulties have a considerable awareness-forming effect and reinforce the basic attitude of the cadets toward the profession which they have chosen. It is, of course, important that the training officer also be able to make successful application of his knowledge concerning skill development. And it is not in the last instance important that, above all, he himself possesses the qualifications required of training group leaders. The training officer thus consciously uses his personality attributes in connection with the education and development of cadets.

The teacher-student relationships exert a significant influence on the personality development of the cadets. They can promote or retard the cadets' readiness to perform and their creative initiative, and they thus exert a direct influence on the results to be striven for in the educational and developmental process. Positive learning attitudes and--over and above these--high learning achievements are obtained wherever it is possible to bring about positive teacher-student relations.

Each and every training officer is coresponsible for the development of truly socialist relations between the educators' collective and the cadets. The general principle for the character of these relations is this: Make the highest of demands on the cadet and at the same time extend to him the best possible help and support!

#### The Platoon Collective

The socialist officer personality is shaped in the military collective. This fact forms the basis upon which the creative forces and the skills of each individual unfold. This also applies to the cadets' education and development into training group leaders. In this respect the conditions existing in a particular platoon collective become effective to a decisive degree.

The relations among the members of the collective and the continually evolving group norms influence the training and shaping of each individual to a considerable extent. The best results are achieved in those platoon collectives in which the role and the tasks of political work among the armed forces has been clarified already in the first training year and in which relations of mutual respect, confidence, and comradely assistance have developed. It is therefore the task of the training officer continually to exert influence on the group norms and relations in the platoon collectives and to utilize them for qualifying the cadets for carrying out political work.

#### The Study Subject

In the sphere of socio-scientific education, each study subject shares in the work of qualifying the cadet to become a training group leader. In this connection the contents of the training, depending on the character of the various study subjects, and consequently also the possibilities afforded are quite variegated. There are subjects which contain specific training themes such as, for instance, those for the preparation, execution, and evaluation of the political training. Optimum development of the skills necessary for effective functioning as training group leaders requires, however, that the educational activities in all subjects be utilized for this purpose to an ever greater extent. Particularly the contents of the various exercises in connection with the

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study of the classics, argumentation and refutation, and preparation of awareness analyses should to a greater extent than has hitherto been the case be oriented toward qualifying the prospective officers to become training group leaders. Another task of the training officer is also to make available for this purpose the pertinent reference materials with respect to a particular study subject. In this connection, the selection of suitable literature for purposes of preparation for the training courses is also important. In so doing one should definitely take into account the book "Methodik der Politischen Bildung" /Methodology of Political Training/, which has been written by a Soviet authors' collective.<sup>5</sup> It provides valuable suggestions pertaining to pedagogic-methodic questions.

#### Shaping of Pedagogic Guidance Activity in the Course of Training

The pedagogic guidance activity of the training officer is one of the most important external conditions for enabling cadets to become training group officers. It is a factor which produces many-layered effects. However, for reasons of space, we will point out here only those aspects which are not always accorded sufficient attention in the actual work of the training officers.

Preparing a cadet for service as a training group leader particularly also means developing in him faculties for creative and independent action and for acting responsibly. Experience has taught us the following: The training group leader is consistently confronted by some concrete pedagogic situation which must be handled and for which there can be no pat formulas. For this reason the cadets should, wherever possible, be placed in situations which require creative, independent, and responsible approaches.

It is the duty of the training officers actively to include the cadets in the training process, in its preparation, execution, and evaluation, and in so doing to utilize the most manifold forms and methods. Among others, the following possibilities for accomplishing this are available:

--short, spontaneous talks,

--independent preparation and supervision of exercises, and

--participation in the preparation of performance and conduct analyses of the platoon collective.

A good showing has been made in the case of those study assignments which must be carried out under the supervision of the group leader. A concrete accounting is given of how the theoretical problems have been

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mastered, and which methodical steps for the solution of the task concerned were taken. Discussions are held concerning it and the performance is evaluated. Other possibilities for educating the cadets to engage in creative, independent work include consultations with cadets on the contents and methodical shaping of the training and administration of the practical portion of the cadets' political training examination.

Important is also the extent to which it is possible to shape the socio-scientific training in a manner which is oriented toward actual practice and which is troop-related. The training officer must know how to impart to the cadets a realistic picture of life with the troops and of the conditions to be expected. He should direct their attention to contradictions in the appearance and conduct of the soldiers and noncommissioned officers, to manifestations which become noticeable in the day-to-day struggle of army personnel for a continually high level of combat readiness.

Seminars and exercises have proved to be particularly productive in cases where the training group leader refers to the moods and opinions of soldiers who play a part in political discussions. Pedagogic activities in which the personal interests of the cadets are used as points of departure for the handling of the subject matter also impart valuable knowledge to the prospective training group leaders.

An important concern is that of developing the pedagogic-methodic capabilities of the cadets. They must have an opportunity to prove themselves in actual practice and it is at the same time necessary that the training officers demonstrate for the cadets the pedagogic-methodic procedures in the course of training. In this connection it is necessary to select the subject matter even more carefully and not to overload the training activities with problems.

Thus the training officer acquires greater possibilities for suitable pedagogic-methodic shaping of his training activities, and he thereby also creates more favorable conditions for the cadets' acquisition of the qualifications which are necessary for their acting in the capacity of training group leaders. The systematic qualification of the cadets for engaging in political work, and especially for service as training group leaders, requires coordination of all tasks and measures planned for this purpose. The training officer must exert his direct influence on this. Especially to be coordinated are the efforts expanded by the various training collectives to develop certain capabilities among the cadets and the sequence in which the planned measures are to be carried out. In addition, it is important that each and every cadet be informed of the level of development which he has attained. This must be done in a manner which makes it possible that he recognizes his progress and is at the same time stimulated to develop himself further.

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The external conditions of socio-scientific work described here show that the qualification of cadets for service as training group leaders is not the result of the sum total of spontaneous individual measures. Rather, it is the product of a purposeful, systematic, and organized process.

#### Influence of Internal Conditions

Marxist psychology provides the knowledge that all external conditions are affected by internal conditions and that they always involve the entire personality.<sup>6</sup>

When a training officer requests a cadet to prepare himself for a problem discussion, the cadet reacts to this in a manner which corresponds to his personality. Such a request addresses itself to his knowledge and experience as well as to his needs, interests, capabilities, feelings, and so forth. It is therefore necessary purposively to include also the system of internal conditions in the process of personality development.

The training officer must know the individual cadet well and--basing himself on the personality characteristics which are to a certain extent distinctly marked--he must make demands which serve the further development of the prospective officer. Just what conditions should be taken into consideration in this connection?

#### Acquired Knowledge

Acquired knowledge is a necessary condition for the development of certain capabilities which the training group leader must have. The importance which acquisition of knowledge has for personality development cannot be stressed enough. "A rich, well-ordered treasure of knowledge and experience is the decisive prerequisite for all-round personality development. It forms, as it were, the substantive basis of the socialist personality, for neither mental-practical capabilities nor firm ideological convictions and character attributes can be developed in the absence of content, as formal attributes, as it were."<sup>7</sup>

Each and every training officer must therefore see to it that the cadets acquire thorough knowledge and that no curtailment takes place with respect to the requirements of the educational program.

#### Attitude of the Cadets

Of decisive importance for the successful acquisition and the further development of the required capabilities is that the cadets have a clear concept of their significance as regards both their work as training group leaders and their own personality development. The development of certain capabilities depends on the existence of adequate attitudes. The task of educating cadets to be proud of their chosen profession must take top priority in this connection.

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### The Motivational Aspect

The cadets must be educated and trained in a manner which will motivate them not only to be willing purposively to acquire the required skills but which will also cause them to feel the urge to apply their knowledge and abilities in the sphere of socio-scientific training and in their practical political work. This means the following: Skill development and motivation shaping must form a unified whole. Skills will be useful only if, in the course of their development, there evolves at the same time a strong interest and a steadfast inclination toward the activity concerned.

### Actual Practice

In his practical work as training group leader, the cadet gathers the experience necessary for perfecting his skills precisely in this sphere.

The thoughts which have been presented here lead us to the following conclusion: The unity of knowledge conveyance, attitude and motivation shaping, and skill development in the course of actual work must be ensured without fail. Only in this way is it possible to develop those attributes which the training group leader needs in order to be able to live up to the requirements called for in the preparation, execution, and evaluation of political training.

### Additional Training in the Troop Units

The real development into a training group leader of the young officer begins with his service with the troops. In this connection one should pay attention to the fact that the young officer continues to be a person who is learning and that it is therefore necessary to introduce him to his tasks gradually.

It is similarly necessary to make high demands on him and at the same time to give him systematic guidance and support. It is in this way that optimum help is extended to him.

Experience to date has shown that in the course of the young officer's further development into a training group leader, positive results are achieved particularly in situations in which the following points are observed:

--It is not advisable to employ the young officer as a training group leader immediately upon his assignment to the troops. He should be given time to size up his new unit and to get his feet on the ground, as it were. If his work as a training group leader is to be successful, the young officer needs to have a thorough knowledge of what the tasks of

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the unit are and of what kinds of problems will show up in connection with their solution. He needs to have a comprehensive picture of the thinking and conduct of armed forces personnel, and it is not in the last instance necessary that he acquire in his assigned job certain experiences in connection with political work with people.

--if, after such a transition period, the young officer is then employed as a training group leader, one must make sure in each case that he participates in preliminary training and that he is permitted adequate time for his personal preparation. Experience has shown that the young training group leader needs more comprehensive guidance and that he also needs more time for his own preparation than older and more experienced training group leaders.

--Superior officers should see to it that the young officers purposively perfect the knowledge and skills which they have acquired at the officer academy and that they also develop themselves further in the pedagogic-methodic sphere. Advanced socio-scientific education offers many possibilities in this respect, and they must be utilized without fail.

An important basis for the personality development of the training group leader is his active work in the basic party organization. A party leadership is well advised if it regularly concerns itself with questions of political training and if, in so doing, it also evaluates the activities of the training group leaders, for the contribution which they are making to the attainment of a continually high level of the combat readiness of their unit is an important criterion for the effectiveness of political training.

#### FOOTNOTES

1. Hoffmann, H.: "Statements by the Minister for National Defense at the Conference of Young Officers on 14 and 15 December 1971." Defense Ministry Publication, p 22.
2. Korobeynikov, M. P.: "Soldat und Krieg" (Soldier and War), Berlin, 1972, p 282.
3. Hoffmann, H.: Loc. cit., pp 29 and 30.
4. Verner, W.: "For a High Fighting Strength and Combat Readiness Level." In: PARTEIARBEITER, Berlin, 1974. Special issue on the occasion of the 9th delegate conference, p 51.
5. See: Authors' collective: "Methodik der Politischen Bildung" (Methodology of Political Training), Berlin, 1974.

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6. See Robinstein, S. L.: "Das Denken und die Wege seiner Erforschung" (The Thought Process and Related Research Procedures), Berlin, 1961, p 12.
7. Neuner, G. and others: "Lehrplanwerk und Unterrichtsgestaltung" (Study Course Planning and Instruction Shaping), Berlin, 1970, p 40.

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# SOVIET D-902 SNOW PLOW ASSESSED

East Berlin MILITAERWESEN in German Nov 74 pp 116B-118B

[By Lt Col H. -J. Sievers, engineer]

/Text/ During 1972 and 1973, the airfield maintenance units of the LSK/LV /air forces and air defense command/ were equipped with the Soviet D-902 snow plow. The SF-1 snow plow hitherto kept in stock was no longer able to meet requirements.

The D-902 snow plow, along with pertinent tactical-technological data and operational principles, has been presented earlier in the 10/72 issue of MILITAERWESEN. In spite of the mild winter of 1973/74, we now have available reports on the initial experiences gathered in connection with its use.

The sudden beginning of winter weather at the end of November 1973 provided the first test of the D-902's worth. With snow thicknesses of 20 to 25 centimeters developing within 24 hours, the highest efficiency levels of the past ten years were attained.

Whereas hitherto the plowing of the pushed snow masses had almost in all instances turned into a winter service problem, the D-902 snow plow easily handled even high snow accumulations.

It became apparent that the D-902 did not reach its performance limits even under extreme conditions. This has a favorable effect in terms of a long life of the motors and of the plowing and power transmission parts.

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# Experience Gathered from Use To-date

One specialist is entirely capable of handling the D-902 snow plow. The operating, control, and safety instruments are arranged clearly and practically. Operating the D-902 requires full concentration on the part of the specialists, and they must apply such concentration both to the maintenance of the prescribed performance parameters of the snow plow and to the execution of neat and effective plowing work. In darkness, the need for alertness increases. In spite of this, addition of an auxiliary driver is not advantageous since the diverting effects of such practice outweigh the possibilities of providing assistance to the driver. Operational use of the D-902 has shown that supplementary installation of a revolution indicator favorably influences the working life span of the SIL 375 traction motor. As a result of the noise of the 1 D 12 BS service motor which operates the plowing mechanism the traction motor, which runs at practically idling speed, can not be heard in the driver's compartment and there exists the danger that during the plowing operation the traction motor will for an extended time run at engine speeds which are either too high or too low. The fact that the motor is running is indicated only by the ignition control light's going out or by the pressure shown on the oil pressure gauge of the traction motor.

When shifted into traction gear, the D-902 operates within a speed range of 0.45 to 3.75 kilometers per hour after having been shifted from the 1st through the 5th forward gears.

From this it is obvious that the driving speed can be changed only minimally with the use of the gas pedals.

Installation in 1975 of commercial-type electronic revolution indicators is planned for all D-902 snow plows.

It is advantageous for the working life of the power transmission parts not to use the traction gear for plowing operations. Experience has shown that it has been possible to handle snow accumulations which in some cases were as high as 1.20 meters with the 2nd or 1st driving gear without overtaxing them in the slightest.

The traction gear is intended for meteorological conditions which occur on the airfields of the LSK/LV only on the rarest of occasions.

If it should nevertheless become necessary to shift to the traction gear, then utmost care must be taken that shifting of the change-speed gear (1st to 5th gear) is categorically done only when the basic vehicle is standing still. As a rule, the vehicle which has been shifted to traction gear comes to an immediate standstill when the clutch is disengaged

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because of the masses of snow in front of the plow box. However, things are different when driving if no plowing is being done. Through the thrust effect of the moving vehicle which weighs 15.2 tons by itself, acceleration before disengaging the clutch results in an overburdening of a shaft of the power-drive transmission and, under unfavorable conditions, in its being broken. This was determined as the result of an investigation of two incidents of breakage of this shaft on a D-902.

The use of the D-902 is most effective if one begins plowing snow accumulations when they are no higher than about 30 centimeters, i.e. when it is possible to carry out the plowing with a speed of 13 to 20 kilometers per hour. This reduces the stress placed on the propelling vehicles equipped with frontal snow plows, because there is no need for the power required for moving big snow accumulations away. At the same time this improves their working range and thus also the speed of their snow clearing operations and their power-area ratio.

Plowing at speeds of 15 to 20 kilometers per hour represents a high strain on the skids of the plow box of the D-902. Depending on the condition of the surface involved (concrete or blacktop), they are subjected to a relatively high rate of wear and tear. From this it follows that the proper height setting of the skids must be checked regularly. If this is neglected, a complete wearing down of the skids and, in addition, damage to the underside of the plow box may result.

At that time when preparations for winter are being made, one should already have a sufficient supply of skids made and skids should be replaced in good time.

When plowing, one must see to it that the lever which activates the pilot valve for the lifting and lowering of the plow box is in the lowest position (floating position). Through the floating position, a balancing effect is achieved in the hydraulic system and the plow box is prevented from jumping to a considerable extent.

If, when plowing, the 3rd position is erroneously engaged from above, the plow box will be pushed down by the hydraulic lifter and by its own weight, and extremely high wear and tear of the skids will result. The speed of the helical plow blades and that of the snow expeller are coordinated so favorably that any kind of snow (ranging from powder snow to slush) can be easily plowed without the slightest stopping up of the snow to be expelled even when the plow motor runs at medium speeds. The shortcoming of the SF-1 snow plow, the work capacity of which was exceeded and the snow ejection ducts of which were clogged when plowing wet, heavy snow, is entirely nonexistent in the D-902.

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It was possible to routinely handle even wet snow accumulations which, due to a rapid sinking of temperatures, had already been covered with an ice-crust, thanks to the cutting edges on the plow box and thanks to the ducts on the plow's helical blades.

The throwing distance and throwing velocity increase as the snow masses get thicker. There is danger of persons getting hurt or technical materiel or buildings (windows, roofs) being damaged particularly when plowing wet or frozen snow accumulations on the main runway or in the areas where technical installations or equipment are located. This is to be pointed out particularly to the D-902 specialists in the course of their thorough training and instruction before they are assigned to this service.

Experience has shown that the work of plowing snow accumulations can be done neatly only if

- the speed of the D-902 is adapted to the size of the snow accumulation,
- the snow mass pushed through the side reamers is smaller than the width of the plow box, and
- the skids have the proper height setting (about 10 mm).

It is useful to equip all plow boxes of the D-902 with snow deflector fins. By doing this, the snow is prevented from falling out of the sides of the plow box. Operation of the D-902 has shown that the traction and the service motor work under all meteorological conditions within the range of the parameters listed in the pertinent operating instructions. It should be noted that the coolant temperature of the service motor is subject to fluctuations which can, however, be held to permissible norms by means of the radiator louvers and the service cabin hatches. A high sense of responsibility for continuous operational readiness of the D-902 snow plow is required by the specialists. They must be able to master the URAL 375 E basic vehicle and the special mounting.

#### Development of Specialists

The need to conduct strict technical maintenance, inspections, and controls as well as the need for detection and elimination of minor troubles by individuals on their own initiative make particularly high demands on maintenance personnel.

Experience gathered in the course of the centralized instruction courses for the development of D-902 specialists has shown that not all troop units have paid the necessary attention to the selection of participants in the training courses.



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The participants in the training courses must be prepared on a long-range basis for their enrollment in the central training course. At the time of his being detailed to take the central instruction course the participant in the training course must already possess the following documents:

1. A Class V driver's permit,
2. A military motor vehicle driver's permit, and
3. Proof that he has been instructed in the use of URAL 375-type motor vehicles.

In addition, the training course participant must be instructed in those tasks which await him as a D-902 specialist, so that all participants have the necessary degree of readiness for this instruction when the instruction course begins.

In summary, we can make the assessment that the D-902 has fully met all expectations with respect to its performance and dependability. It is particularly under conditions when sweeper-blower equipment<sup>1</sup> is used that its importance for a speedy restoration of the usability of the air operations areas increases because of its relatively high plowing speed. Its dependability and its effective use depend to a considerable degree on a high level of knowledgeability, ability, and action on the part of the specialists and of the comrades who are responsible for supervising winter-time service. Necessary attention must therefore be paid to their training and qualification as well as to developing in them a high sense of responsibility vis-a-vis technical materiel and for a continuous state of operational readiness of the airfield areas during the winter period.

#### FOOTNOTE

1. See also MILITAERWESEN, B-Edition, Issue No 10, 1974, p 113.

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